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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has lacked a coordinated energy policy since
the beginning of the energy crisis decade of the 1970's. The pri-
mary focus of policy-makers has been United States dependence
on foreign oil,' but no consistent policy towards it has been devel-
oped. At the height of the OPEC oil embargo, 1973 to 1974, Presi-
dent Nixon announced that the United States would never be de-
pendent on foreign oil again nor be held hostage by OPEC. Project
Independence was aimed at achieving energy self-sufficiency by
1980.2 However, Project Independence produced only a lengthy
document having few readers.8 The long gas lines were temporary
inconveniences.
The situation returned to near normal until the energy crisis be-
came the "moral equivalent of war" under the Carter administra-
tion." President Carter's approach to the problem of dependence
on foreign oil was conservation5 as a panacea. An impending na-
tional catastrophe was to be averted by conservation of the world's
scarce petroleum reserves. Nevertheless, consumers continued to
buy oil and gas despite the continued rise in the price of foreign
oil. Today, warnings of scarcity go unheeded after being heralded
so often.
Many projects have been abandoned. Exxon Corporation has
*Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. J.D., University of Texas at Austin
(1972); LL.M., University of Texas at Austin (1977).
' See President's Address to the Nation Outlining Steps to Deal with the Emergency, 9
WEKLv CoMP. PRS. Doc. 1312-18 (Nov. 7, 1973); President's Message to Congress, 9
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1318-22 (Nov. 8, 1973); President's Report to the American Peo-
ple, 13 WEEKLY CoMP. Pass. Doc. 138 (Feb. 2, 1977); and President's Address to the Nation,
13 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 560-65 (Apr. 18, 1977).
Speech to the Nation, 9 WEEKLY Comp. PRs. Doc. 1312, 1317 (Nov. 7, 1973).
£ FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, PROJECT INDEPENDENCE (1974), hearings were held in
ten major United States cities and more than ten volumes were compiled.
Address to the Nation, 13 WEEKLY Comr. PRs. Doc. 560, 561 (Apr. 18, 1977).
I ld. at 563-64.
* President Carter warned of the impending national catastrophe. Id. at 560.
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abandoned its multi-million dollar oil shale project.7 Nuclear
power plant construction and operation has been curtailed or sus-
pended.8 President Reagan has even suggested dismantling of the
Department of Energy.' There now appears to be a glut of crude
oil on the world market 0 and the energy crisis is almost forgotten.
However, no comprehensive energy policy has yet been formulated.
Energy policy is a political pawn used to placate the various
constituencies in the world and national political arenas. United
States policy toward foreign oil could be predicated on one of two
extreme positions. First, United States policy could be no policy: to
give real effect to the Project Independence posture of making the
United States self-sufficient with regard to petroleum products.
This policy is manifested in the conservation program; develop-
ment of alternative forms of energy such as nuclear, solar, wind,
hydroelectric, and other fossil fuels; development of synthetic pe-
troleum products; and increased exploration and production of do-
mestic oil reserves. Second, the policy with regard to foreign oil
could be to buy as much as possible at whatever price. This alter-
native posture seems to be one based primarily on national secur-
ity and foreign policy. The United States must maintain good rela-
tions with oil producing countries particularly in the Middle East
to stabilize the area and reduce the Soviet influence. Domestic pro-
duction has peaked 1 so that foreign oil is necessary to maintain
modern, oil-dependent technology and machinery which in turn
support United States defense capabilities. To accomplish this goal
foreign oil purchases are stored in strategic reservoirs for future
use rather than for immediate consumption."2 This practice has
strained relations with some oil producing sovereigns who see their
future power base being eroded. 18 There is also the baser instinct
7 Tmz, May 17, 1982, at 58-59.
8 Since the accident at the nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island, the Bailey Nuclear Plant
construction has been abandoned and the Diablo Canyon Reactor in California operation
has been delayed. Three Mile Island had a chilling effect on the nuclear power industry.
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 8, 1982, at 63 and NEWSWEEK, Apr. 19, 1982, at 101.
I See Statement of Plan to Dismantle the Department of Energy, 17 WEEKLY Comp. PRES.
Doc. 1378 (Dec. 17, 1981).
10 NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 1982, at 64.
" See President's Address to the Nation, 13 WEEKLaY Coamp. PREs. Doc., 560, 561 (Apr. 18,
1977). But see Statement of M.A. Adelman, petroleum economist, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
RE., Apr. 9, 1979, at 22, in which he states that proved plus probable reserves will suffice
for 50-100 years depending on the rate of consumption.
" See Message to Congress Transmitting the Plan, 17 WEEKLY Comp. PRlES. Doc. at 772
(July 17, 1981) in which the rapid filling of our strategic petroleum reserves is called for.
I8 If the United States fills its strategic petroleum reserves during the current oil glut,
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for survival which dictates that the use of "their" oil first and
hoarding "ours" for use after "they" have run dry.
Because of the lack of a coordinated energy policy, United States
policy with regard to foreign oil travels the spectrum between the
two extreme positions. This article examines the manifestations of
this lack of a coordinated policy in the area of taxation.
II. TAX POLICY
A. Foreign Oil
Most tax jurisdictions in the world impose taxes on the basis of
source of income. In addition, many countries tax on the basis of
residence or citizenship. In the United States the federal govern-
ment uses source,' residence,' 5 and citizenship"6 as bases of taxa-
tion. Consequently, multinational enterprises often are subject to
double taxation of the same income; one jurisdiction would tax
based on the source of income, and the other jurisdiction on the
basis of residence and/or citizenship. Since such double taxation
would inhibit exploration and extraction of oil and gas and other
minerals abroad, Congress has provided the foreign tax credit in
I.R.C. §§ 901-907. The United States, having become the country
of residence or citizenship of many multinational enterprises,
therefore allows as a credit against its income tax certain taxes
paid to the country of source. However, only foreign income, war
profits, and excess profits taxes paid or accrued during the taxable
year or taxes that are in lieu of those taxes are creditable against
the United States income tax.' Alternatively, a taxpayer who has
paid or accrued creditable foreign taxes may elect to deduct those
taxes rather than take them as a foreign tax credit.' A taxpayer
who elects to take the foreign tax credit may not also elect to de-
duct foreign taxes for any taxable year that the taxpayer elects to
take the tax credit. 9
Since the purpose of the foreign tax credit is the avoidance of
OPEC's political weapon, the oil boycott, will not be effective in the short term.
14 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVI, gives Congress the power to tax income "from whatever
source derived."
" The doctrine of state's sovereignty dictates that the state exercise its legislative power
over its own territory and that power extends to all persons within that territory whether a
national or alien. See Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378 (1933).
" Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
17 I.R.C. §§ 901(b)(1), 903 (1976).
18 I.R.C. § 164(a)(3) (1976).
'9 I.R.C. § 275(a)(4) (1976).
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double taxation by two or more sovereigns on the same income, the
foreign tax credit is not intended to be used to recharacterize an
expense such as royalties as a tax which can then be taken as a
foreign tax credit On November 4, 1950, the Saudi Arabian gov-
ernment issued a Royal Decree which imposed a general income
tax on the incomes of individuals and corporations in Saudi Ara-
bia.20 On December 27, 1950, the Saudi Arabian government im-
posed an additional tax on every company registered or required to
be registered in accordance with the decree for the registration of
companies which were engaged in the production of petroleum or
other hydrocarbons in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 1 In 1955, the
Internal Revenue Service, in Revenue Ruling 55-296," held that
both the general income tax and the additional tax imposed by the
Saudi Arabian Royal Decrees would be allowed as a credit against
United States income tax. Revenue Ruling 55-296 appears to have
been politically motivated. In the pre-energy crisis era, United
States imports of foreign oil were not critical. Prices were not exor-
bitant since the major oil companies were dictating prices to the oil
producing sovereigns. Moreover, it was beneficial to the major oil
companies to have their royalty payments characterized as taxes.
The tax construed to be an income tax would be credited against
their United States income tax liability. By allowing a tax credit
for this type of payment to Saudi Arabia, the United States could
be viewed as providing indirect foreign aid to Saudi Arabia by
shifting money from the United States treasury to the Saudi Ara-
bian treasury. As a matter of foreign policy, the United States had
relinquished a major part of its policy-making responsibility to the
major oil producers in the Middle East in order to maintain an
American presence and degree of control over the situation in the
Middle East. Maintaining an American presence and having Amer-
ican oil companies develop the oil resources in the Middle East
were deemed to be more desirable than allowing those oil resources
to come under the influence of hostile authority. The problem in-
volved with the foreign tax credit is the dual function of oil pro-
ducing sovereigns. Not only is the land owned by the sovereign so
that the sovereign collects royalties as an ordinary owner of prop-
erty, but the sovereign also has the power to levy taxes. Although
the oil producing sovereigns characterize the payments as taxes,
o Royal Decree No. 17/2/28/3321.
" Royal Decree No. 17/2/28/7634.
22 1955-1 C.B. 386.
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the payments actually have more attributes of royalty payments
than taxes.
The Internal Revenue Service subsequently reconsidered its po-
sition in Revenue Ruling 55-296 that allowed the credit for both
taxes.23 In Revenue Ruling 78-63 the Service revoked Revenue
Ruling 55-296,' 4 and determined that the additional tax imposed
by the decree of the Saudi Arabian government was not an income
tax. The additional tax imposed by decree as computed was based
on a posted price established by the Saudi Arabian government.
The posted price in most cases exceeded the actual market price;
therefore, the tax was not imposed on actual income but on an ar-
tificial or ficticious income based on the posted price and, conse-
quently, was noncreditable as an income tax. Like Revenue Ruling
55-296, Revenue Ruling 78-63 also had political overtones: it was
issued during the energy crisis of 1977-78.
Revenue Ruling 78-63 is in accord with I.R.C. § 901(f) which
provides that certain payments for oil or gas are not considered as
taxes if the taxpayer has no economic interest in the oil and gas
depleted under I.R.C. § 611(a),25 and either the purchase or sale is
at a price which differs from fair market value. If both conditions
are satisfied then the amount of income or war profits or excess
profits taxes paid or accrued to any foreign country, in connection
with the sale or purchase of oil and gas extracted in that country,
is neither a deductible tax under I.R.C. § 275(a)(4) nor a creditable
tax under I.R.C. § 901. An economic benefit in oil and gas which is
depletable means an ownership interest whereby the owner ex-
tracts the mineral in order to gain a return on the capital in-
vested.2 6 A person with no capital investment in the mineral de-
posit does not possess an economic interest merely by deriving an
economic or pecuniary advantage from production as a result of a
contractual relationship. In order to have a creditable foreign tax
where a foreign government owns the minerals being extracted the
taxpayer must satisfy five requirements.28 First, the amount of the
" See Rev. Rul. 78-63, 1978-1 C.B. 228.
24 Id. at 232.
"I Depletion is only allowed to the owner of an economic interest. Depletion may be de-
fined to be the exhaustion of oil and gas reserves by extraction. A deduction is allowed to
compensate taxpayers for the diminution of their oil and gas reserves. I.R.C. §§ 611, 612,
613, 613A (1976); Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
2' Tress. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (1968).
27 Id.
" Internal Revenue News Release IR-1638, [1976) 9 STAND. FzD. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 6751
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income tax must be calculated separately and independently of
any royalty or other tax paid to the government.2" Second, under
the law and its administration the foreign income tax must be im-
posed on the receipt of income by the taxpayer using principles
consistent with the United States concept of realization, and such
income must be determined on an arms length basis."0 Third, the
income tax liability cannot be discharged with property owned by
the foreign government; that is, the payment may not be made in
kind." Fourth, the income tax liability is to be computed on the
basis of results of the taxpayer's entire extractive operation. 2
Fifth, the taxpayer must be allowed to deduct significant expenses
incurred in such extraction.s Revenue Ruling 78-222 imposes a
sixth requirement that the foreign government must require pay-
ment of a royalty or other consideration in addition to payment of
income tax.34 Under Temporary Regulation § 4.901-2,15 a foreign
tax is an income tax if and only if the charge is not compensation
for a specific economic benefit, the charge is based on net realized
income under standards similar to the United States realized in-
come standards, and the charge follows the reasonable rules of the
taxing jurisdiction."
On the surface the foreign tax credit appears to be neutral as far
as the energy ramifications are concerned and is merely intended
to avoid double taxation of foreign source income by a foreign sov-
ereign and the United States. The foreign tax credit ensures that
the taxpayer will pay the higher rate of the United States or the
foreign country.37 However, the credit is not intended to provide a
(July 14, 1976).
" Id.
I d.
1 Id.
02 Id.
"Id.
" 1978-1 C.B. 232.
$ Temporary Tress. Reg. § 4.901-2, [1981] 6 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 4302A
(adopted by T.D. 7739, Nov. 12, 1980).
Id. § 4.901-2(a)(1)(i) to (iii).
' I.R.C. § 907(a) (1976) limits the tax credit on foreign oil and gas extraction taxes for
corporations to the highest rate specified in I.R.C. § 11(b) (1976) and in the case of individ-
uals to the effective United States tax rate. Corporations or individuals who paid or accrued
foreign oil and gas extraction taxes at a rate equal to or higher than their United States tax
rate will pay no United States income tax but will pay the entire amount of foreign oil and
gas extraction taxes levied by the foreign sovereign. Corporations or individuals who paid or
accrued foreign oil and gas extraction taxes at a rate lower than their United States tax rate
will receive a full credit for the foreign oil and gas extraction taxes paid or accrued and pay
at the higher United States tax rate.
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tax advantage to foreign investors. The amount of the credit is lim-
ited to United States tax liability as provided in I.R.C. §§ 904 and
907.38 The foreign tax credit, however, does encourage foreign in-
vestment by eliminating double taxation and provides foreign in-
vestment companies with essentially the same tax base that do-
mestic corporations have. Thus, the foreign tax credit provides for
a horizontal equity between domestic oil-producing operations and
foreign oil-producing operations. By not discriminating against for-
eign exploration and extraction of oil and gas, the foreign tax
credit indirectly encourages foreign exploration and extraction op-
erations. The foreign tax credit also serves United States foreign
policy by providing indirect economic aid to friendly foreign sover-
eigns. It also provides the same aid to less friendly sovereigns. Al-
though the foreign tax credit is not a direct tax expenditure, it is a
shifting of tax revenues from the United States treasury to a for-
eign treasury. Certainly as a matter of energy policy, in the event
that the United States desired to curtail or eliminate the influx of
foreign oil into the United States, severe limitation or disallowance
of the foreign tax credit on foreign oil and gas income would be a
logical step in accomplishing that goal.
I.R.C. § 907 provides special rules for the treatment of taxes on
foreign oil and gas extraction income s and foreign oil related in-
come.4 0 Section 907 places limitations on the amount qualifying as
foreign taxes for purposes of the foreign tax credit in I.R.C. § 901.
After December 31, 1982, I.R.C. § 907(b) excludes from the term
"income, war profits, and excess profits taxes" any foreign tax on
foreign oil related income which is "materially greater' 1 than for-
The limitation in I.R.C. § 907(a) (1976) is discussed in footnote 37, supra. I.R.C. § 904
(1976) imposes a limitation on the foreign tax credit to the extent of United States tax
before the credit. Section 904 is intended to prevent higher foreign tax rates from being
subsidized from the United States treasury through the tax credit.
3' Foreign oil and gas extraction income is taxable income derived from foreign sources
from the extraction of minerals from oil and gas wells by any person or the sale or exchange
of those assets used by the taxpayer in the extraction of minerals from oil and gas wells.
I.R.C. § 907(c)(1) (1976).
40 Foreign oil related income is taxable income derived from foreign sources from the
processing, transportation, or distribution or sale of minerals from oil or gas wells or pri-
mary products or the sale or exchange of assets used by the taxpayer to produce foreign oil
related income. I.R.C. § 907(c)(2) (1976).
4' The term "materially greater" will be defined by the Internal Revenue Service in a
future regulation, although the statute provides that "materially greater" will be measured
"over a reasonable period of time." Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-248, § 211(c)(1), 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (enacted Sept. 3, 1982 and codified at I.R.C. §
907(b) (1982)).
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eign taxes generally imposed by that sovereign on income that is
not foreign oil related income nor foreign oil and gas extraction
income.42 Such excess will not be a creditable tax for purposes of
I.R.C. § 901; however, that amount is to be treated as a deduction
under the law of the foreign sovereign.4 The effect of the § 907(a)
limitation is to limit the amount of the creditable tax from foreign
oil and gas extraction income to that amount which would have
resulted if the maximum United States tax rates were used."
Congress also has repealed the separate I.R.C. § 904 credit limi-
tation computation required by I.R.C. § 907(b) for foreign oil re-
lated income and other taxable income. 45 The separate limitation
on foreign oil related income required by I.R.C. § 907(b) prior to
December 31, 1982 provided an additional limitation on the foreign
tax credit and worked to the benefit of the federal government
where other business activities were taxed at rates lower than the
foreign oil and gas extraction tax rate. This change for 'taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1982 is accompanied by a
change in the definition of foreign oil related income. Foreign oil
and gas extraction income had been included in the definition of
foreign oil related income. Since foreign oil and gas extraction tax
credits were limited by I.R.C. § 907(a), foreign oil related income
was treated separately in computing the creditable tax under
I.R.C. § 901. Foreign oil and gas extraction income has been re-
moved from the definition of foreign oil related income" by the
repeal of the separate computation requirement. I.R.C. § 907 is
designed to prevent a taxpayer from using foreign tax credits
which would reduce United States tax liability upon United States
source income.47 Any excess foreign oil and gas extraction income
taxes which are not allowed as a tax credit because of limitations
in I.R.C. § 907 are not deductible. 4" The limitations in I.R.C. § 907
discourage oil companies from production of foreign oil and gas in
those countries where the extraction taxes exceed the maximum
42 Id.
48 Id.
See supra note 37.
'8 Id. The repeal of the § 904 credit limitation is effective for taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1982.
" Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 211(b), 96
Stat. 324 (1982) (enacted Sept. 3, 1982 and codified at I.R.C. § 907(c)(2) (1982)).
"I H.R. RmP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 223 reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. Nzws 2897, 3653-54.
8 I.R.C. § 275(a)(4) (1976).
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tax rate imposed on such income in the United States. No incen-
tive is provided to produce foreign oil and gas to the exclusion of
domestic oil and gas production, because the excess foreign oil and
gas extraction taxes cannot be used to offset United States income
tax of domestic oil and gas production income. Moreover, the ex-
cess foreign oil and gas extraction income tax may not be deducted
under I.R.C. § 275(a)(4); therefore, the tax benefit ceases except
for the carryover provisions which are also limited.
The two percent of foreign oil and gas extraction income limita-
tion on the carryback or carryover of excess foreign oil and gas
extraction income taxes not creditable in a taxable year has been
repealed.49 After December 31, 1982, the excess of any foreign oil
and gas extraction taxes not allowed as a tax credit in a taxable
year may be carried back two years or forward five years provided
that the excess carryback or carryover, plus other creditable taxes,
do not exceed the I.R.C. §§ 904 and 907(a) limitations. These tax
credit limitations also serve as a deterrent to a foreign oil and gas
producing sovereign from imposing high tax rates on foreign oil
and gas extraction income. Since the foreign tax cannot be credited
against United States income tax, oil producing enterprises subject
to United States income tax would curtail activities in any country
imposing a higher tax rate because there would be no correspond-
ing tax benefit for the high foreign oil and gas extraction income
tax rates. From a policy standpoint, the limitations on the foreign
tax credit allowed under I.R.C. § 901 only deter production of oil
and gas in those countries in which the foreign oil and gas extrac-
tion income taxes exceed the United States tax rate. Those limita-
tions, however, do not discourage foreign oil and gas production in
those countries in which the foreign oil and gas extraction income
tax is equal to or less than the tax rate imposed by the United
States.
In retrospect, United States tax policy with regard to the foreign
tax credit in the past has encouraged production of foreign oil and
gas, as evidenced by the early lenient view of the Internal Revenue
Service in treating disguised royalty payments as taxes and al-
lowing those payments to be credited against United States income
tax. As the political situation in the Middle East deteriorated and
OPEC gained power, United States policy toward the foreign tax
credit began to change. First, the I.R.S. reassessed its earlier views
"' Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 211(d)(2), 96
Stat. 324 (1982) (enacted Sept. 3, 1982 and codified at I.R.C. § 907(f) (1982)).
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with respect to the disguised royalty payments and declared that
those payments were no longer creditable.50 In the Tax Reduction
Act of 1975,1" the Tax Reform Act of 1976,52 and the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,11 Congress imposed limita-
tions on the foreign tax credit allowed for foreign oil and gas ex-
traction income taxes and foreign oil related income taxes so that
the maximum foreign tax credit on foreign oil and gas extraction
income taxes would be no more than the tax that would have been
imposed on United States source income. The result is that the
foreign tax credit provides some incentive to continue foreign oil
and gas production but only in those countries where the foreign
oil and gas extraction income tax rates do not exceed the maxi-
mum United States income tax rate that would be imposed if it
were United States source income.
B. Domestic Oil
As a matter of energy policy if one is to curtail the importation
of foreign oil, provisions must be made for the replacement or sub-
stitution of that foreign oil supply. Substitution of the foreign oil
supply requires encouragement or incentives to increase domestic
exploration and production, the development of synthetic fuels,
development of solar, wind, hydroelectric sources, or the develop-
ment of other fossil fuels. United States tax policy affects the de-
velopment of these alternative sources.
Two primary parts of President Carter's energy policy were the
Crude Oil Windfall Tax Act of 1980' and the phased decontrol of
domestic crude oil prices.55 The price controls on domestic crude
oil production were originally established in 1971 and modified in
1973 and 1976. 5' Then, in April of 1979, President Carter an-
o See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
s' Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (1975).
" Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
" Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980). A Windfall Profits Tax had been previously
proposed by President Nixon in President's Message to the Congress Outlining Legislative
Proposals and Executive Actions to Deal with the Crisis, 10 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 72-3,
76-7 (Jan. 23, 1974).
" For President Carter's presentation of this program in a Message to Congress, see 15
WEEKLY Comp. PRzs. Doc. 721-27 (Apr. 26, 1979).
The price controls were adopted pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-201, 85 Stat. 743 (1971). The 1973 price controls are found in 38 Fed. Reg.
33,577 (1973). In 1976, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat.
871 (1975), was enacted and new domestic crude oil price regulations were adopted in 41
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nounced a program to phase out these price controls by October 1,
1981. 57 The windfall profits tax was designed to be a substitute for
price controls. Economically, the difference was that the prices
would be controlled at a higher level. The windfall profits tax is an
excise tax on the selling price of crude oil.68 The tax is imposed on
excess of the selling price over the base price.59 Generally, the
windfall profits tax is similar to a state severance tax. The windfall
profits tax is imposed upon producers of all domestic crude oil re-
moved from property on or after March 1980 with certain excep-
tions.60 The reason for decontrol of the 1971 price restrictions was
to stimulate domestic exploration and production of crude oil and
gas. However, deregulation coupled with the windfall profits tax
has the opposite effect. The incentive to increase domestic explora-
tion and production of crude oil and gas is dampened by the impo-
sition of the windfall profits tax which merely raises the controlled
price that producers may receive for the product. One of the justi-
fications of the windfall profits tax, which is designed to aggregate
a net of 227.3 billion dollars in windfall profit tax revenues, e1 was a
reallocation of resources from oil to alternative energy sources. The
windfall profits tax revenue was designed to support research and
development in other energy areas.62 Thus, the tax was imposed as
part of a coordinated energy policy. The coordinated energy policy
appeared to be a simultaneous reduction of foreign oil imports and
an increase in the availability of other domestic energy supplies,
not necessarily crude oil, the production of which was believed to
have peaked in the United States." Other tax legislation was en-
acted primarily to conserve oil and gas."'
Fed. Reg. 4931 (1976).
57 15 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 721-27 (Apr. 26, 1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 22,010 (1979).
" I.R.C. § 4986(a) (Supp. V 1981).
89 I.R.C. §§ 4988, 4989 (Supp. V 1981).
o See I.R.C. § 4994 (Supp. V 1981) for exceptions.
61 I.R.C. § 4990(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981). The Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax will be phased
out by the later of December 1987 or the first month after December 1987, but before De-
cember 1990 in which an aggregate of $227.3 billion is reached.
" An Energy Security Fund was designed to be the conduit through which revenues from
the windfall profits tax were to be channeled to support better design and efficiency of
automobiles and appliances, mass transit systems, and research and development of other
fossil fuels, oil shale, synthetic petroleum, solar, wind, and hydroelectric energy sources. See
Address to the Nation, 15 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 609-14 (Apr. 5, 1979) and Message to
the Congress, 15 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 721-27 (Apr. 26, 1979).
" See supra note 11.
E.g., Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978). I.R.C. § 44C
(Supp. V 1981) was added to the Internal Revenue Code to provide a tax credit for residen-
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In retrospect the Carter energy program seems to have been the
most comprehensive of the energy programs to date although parts
of it were working at cross purposes.
III. OIL IMPORT FEE
If United States energy policy is to curtail the importation of oil
and gas and thereby reduce American dependence on foreign oil,
an oil import fee could be imposed on each barrel of foreign oil
imported into the United States as an alternative to the tax benefit
in the form of a tax credit. An oil import fee should have two ef-
fects. It should reduce imports and promote conservation as a re-
sult of the increased price for foreign oil and gas. An oil import fee
imposed as a matter of energy policy does not take into considera-
tion the effect of that fee on the federal treasury or on the ultimate
consumers of the oil and gas.
The current interest in an oil import fee in Congress is directed
primarily toward reduction of the budget deficit. 5 Therefore, it is
being considered almost solely as a revenue producing device. A
recent Congressional Budget Office report indicates that an oil im-
port fee of between two and ten dollars per barrel would reduce
the federal deficit by about 10 billion dollars in fiscal year 1983, 9.4
billion dollars in fiscal year 1984, 10.5 billion dollars in fiscal year
1985, 13.2 billion dollars in fiscal year 1986, and 12.4 billion dollars
in fiscal year 19 8 7 .66 A recent report by the Congressional Research
Service released by the House Government Operations Energy
Subcommittee indicates that a $5.00 per barrel import fee would
cut the deficit by 9.4 billion dollars in fiscal year 1982 but would
increase it by 5 billion dollars in fiscal year 1984.e7 When making
projections with respect to the amount of revenue which will be
generated by an oil import fee, the effect of the consequent conser-
vation must also be taken into consideration. An oil import fee of
$2.00 per barrel would cause a daily demand for oil to drop by one
hundred thousand to two hundred thousand barrels per day,
whereas a $10.00 per barrel fee would probably cause a five hun-
tial installation of insulation and residential solar and wind energy equipment. A tax credit
was provided for producing fuel from an unconventional source, I.R.C. § 44D (Supp. V
1981), and for use of alcohol as a fuel. I.R.C. § 44E (Supp. V 1981). For businesses the
investment credit percentage is increased from ten percent to as much as fifteen percent
depending on the type of energy system investment. I.R.C. § 46(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
" See NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22, 1982, at 64.
"[1982] 81 DAmy TAx RE. (BNA) G-7.
e7 Id. at G-8.
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dred thousand to one million barrel per day drop." The decrease
in the number of barrels on a daily basis would result in less reve-
nue being collected as a result of the conservation measures taken
to reduce the cost of imported oil. Consequently, the oil import fee
mechanism would be a temporary measure. A high oil import fee
levied to increase revenues would increase the conservation mea-
sures taken, which in turn would result in a reduction of revenues
being collected.
When viewed from the energy policy standpoint rather than
from a revenue producing standpoint, an oil import fee is desirable
to curtail or limit dependence on imported oil if there are alterna-
tive domestic sources of energy available. In the absence of in-
creased domestic exploration and production, or available alterna-
tive energy sources, the imposition of an import oil fee would have
the effect of a self-embargo. Thus, increased conservation would be
one desirable consequence of an oil import fee. Another desirable
ramification from the energy standpoint is that the oil import fee
would reflect the true cost of the natural resource. Theoretically,
the oil import fee would account for the outflow of revenue from
the federal treasury as a result of the foreign oil and gas extraction
income tax which is credited pursuant to I.R.C. § 901, and it would
include the cost of maintaining friendly relations with the oil pro-
ducing sovereigns as a result of the United States foreign policy
considerations.
From a national security standpoint, self-sufficiency is desirable.
An energy policy which encourages self-sufficiency and reduces re-
liance on foreign oil imports also furthers national security objec-
tives. Any future disruptions in the importation of foreign oil
places a serious limitation on the freedom of the United States to
conduct its foreign policy and severely restricts United States mili-
tary deployment around the world. The United States must have
secure suppliers of strategic materials such as oil and gas. There
are relatively few secure sources of oil and gas at the present time.
The Middle East is still in turmoil as a result of both the Arab-
Israeli crisis and the Arab-Iranian crisis that is developing as Arab
nations are banding together to block Iranian military and political
objectives in the Middle East.6 9 Thus, if the effect of the oil import
fee is conservation and stimulation of domestic production and de-
velopment of alternative energy sources, then the oil import fee is
I d. at G-9.
NEWSWEEK, June 7, 1982, at 46.
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also desirable from a national security policy viewpoint.
The most important political policy consideration with respect
to the oil import fee is social equity. A major problem is deciding
who should bear the burden of an oil import fee. The Consumer
Energy Council of America claims that a fee on imported oil would
increase heating bills in the United States by twenty-one billion
dollars, cause a loss of up to three hundred thousand jobs, and
wipe out the tax cuts of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.70
Their major criticism seems to be that an oil import fee is a regres-
sive tax and, therefore, falls most heavily on the poor who must
spend a greater part of their income on energy for heating and
transportation. Moreover, the impact of an oil import fee would
not have an even geographic distribution but would fall most heav-
ily on the northern United States, particularly the Northeast.71 In
addition to being geographically disproportionate, the cost would
be disproportionately distributed by industry. Paper, steel, pe-
trochemical, and chemical industries would not only pay the in-
creased cost as a result of the imposition of the oil import fee but
would also suffer supply problems as a result of the anticipated
cutback in imports stemming from the higher price per barrel.7 2
The Petroleum Industry Research Foundation estimates. that a
$5.00 per barrel import fee would increase inflation by about 1.3%
in the first full year that it would be in effect, and the gross na-
tional product would fall off by nearly thirty billion dollars." In a
speech before the National Press Club the Chairman of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee, who opposes the oil import fee,
maintained that United States products would not be able to com-
pete in international markets due to the increase in their prices as
a result of the oil import fee. 4 In addition, an oil import fee which
would result in conservation and decreased imported oil in the
United States would have the effect of reducing the oil revenues of
the oil producing sovereigns who would then have to absorb the
cost of United States independence from their oil. The decreased
demand for oil may add to the current glut of crude oil on the
world market; however, that will result in an offsetting decrease in
worldwide production of crude oil and a corresponding increase in
70 See supra note 66.
71 Id.
11 Id. at G-7 to G-8.
73 Id. at G-8.
7, Id.; see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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the per barrel price to offset the losses due to the decreased de-
mand for crude oil in the United States. Those increased costs re-
sulting from conservation in the United States will then be passed
on to the ultimate consumer who must buy gasoline, heating oil,
and petrochemical products.
IV. CONCLUSION
The development of a coordinated energy policy requires a fine
tuning and adjustment of the competing policies served by a coor-
dinated energy policy. National security, revenue raising, and so-
cial equity are all competing policies. A coordinated energy policy
can only be developed by juxtaposing the underlying competing
policies and making those adjustments that are necessary to suit
the situation that arises. It follows, therefore, that a coordinated
energy policy cannot be static but must be responsive to changing
national policy needs.
The optimum national energy policy would be one which accom-
plishes the following objectives. The policy should encourage and
support domestic exploration and extraction of oil and gas. Re-
sources must be devoted to the development of alternative forms
of energy such as solar, nuclear, wind, hydroelectric, other fossil
fuels, and synthetic fuels. Importation of foreign oil must be en-
couraged, particularly from secure sources to make up the shortfall
in United States production and to build up strategic reserves in
order to protect against disruption of supplies and decrease the
country's vulnerability. As the United States becomes more self-
sufficient in energy, cutbacks should be made in imports of foreign
oil beginning with the least secure suppliers. Simultaneously, the
national energy policy must not wreak havoc with the national
economy. Nevertheless, some tradeoff in inflation and higher prices
for petroleum products may have to be made. While social equity
is desirable, it is the user who derives the benefit; therefore, it is
the user who should bear the true cost of the depletion of our nat-
ural resources.
The foreign tax credit tends to support maintaining our current
level of petroleum imports if not actually promoting increased con-
sumption of foreign oil and gas in the United States. The foreign
tax credit should be retained to provide equality of tax impact for
both domestic and foreign oil producers.
An oil import fee, on the other hand, discourages consumption of
foreign oil in the United States and promotes conservation in addi-
tion to being a revenue raising device. As a matter of national se-
1983]
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curity, an oil import fee is desirable if it decreases our dependence
on foreign oil. With respect to social equity, an oil import fee is
regressive and falls unevenly on the population both geographically
and by industry. As a revenue measure, its long term effect is not
desirable, but as an energy measure it would promote conservation
and reflect the true cost of a diminishing natural resource. No im-
port fee should be imposed until such time as the United States
attains a higher degree of self-sufficiency.
Repeal of the Windfall Profits tax coupled with deregulation
should provide the incentive to find more domestic oil and gas at
whatever cost the market will support.
Social equity can be accomplished through the tax law by al-
lowing tax credits or rebates to lower income persons or specific
industries to lighten their burden.
It is time for a coordinated national energy policy in which the
revenue laws support the goals of that national energy policy.
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